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be discouraged, especially since an arbitrator's award is not subject to
judicial review on the merits 9 and the arbitration agreement may
provide for a ceiling on the amount recoverable which is unrelated to
the damages sustained. 00 It is only hoped that Stekardis' liberalization
of CPLR 1209 will not encourage courts, impressed with the time and
energy already expended in preparation for arbitration, to more readily
grant orders permitting arbitration without fully investigating to determine whether this avenue is truly the best method of settling the infant's
claim.
ARTICLE

30-

REMEDIES AND PLEADNGS

CPLR 3022 & 3026: Remedy for defectively verified pleading is to
treat it as a nullity; plaintiff State not prejudiced where prosecution
for perjury is precluded.
According to CPLR 3022, a defectively verified pleading may be
treated as a nullity provided notice with due diligence' 0' is given to the
adverse party. Such notice must specify the reasons for which the plead10 2
ing is returned.
In State v. McMahon,103 New York State sought to recover, in a
civil action, money which had been fraudulently procured by the
defendant. 0 4 By verified complaint, plaintiff alleged that defendant
entered into a conspiracy to, and did, forge and cash two lottery tickets
in the amount of $55,000, $41,700 of which had already been recouped
by plaintiff State. Defendant served an unverified answer, asserting his
privilege against self-incrimination as the basis therefor. 105 By an order
99 See Raisler Corp. v. New York City Housing Auth., 82 N.Y.2d 274, 282, 298 N.E.2d
91, 94-95, 844 N.Y.S.2d 917, 928 (1973); In re Wilkins, 169 N.Y. 494, 496-97, 62 N.E. 575,
576 (1902).
100 Coughlin v. MVIAC, 45 Misc. 2d 672, 674, 257 N.Y.S.2d 549, 552 (Sup. Ct. N.Y.
County 1965) (dictum).
101 See Westchester Life, Inc. v. Westchester Magazine Co., 85 N.Y.S.2d 84 (Sup. CL

N.Y. County 1948) where due diligence was held to require, inter alia, notice within 24
hours. Notice must be issued before trial, in any event, to permit cure of the defect by
amendment. 8 WK&M 8022.03.
102 Westchester Life, Inc. v. Westchester Magazine Co., 85 N.Y.S.2d 84 (Sup. CL N.Y.
County 1948). "It is well settled that a notice accompanying an answer returned for
improper verification or lack of verification must state the defects relied upon specifically,
and that a general statement is not enough." Id. Where insuffcient notice is given to the
adverse party, it is as if the pleading had not been returned at all. Id.; see 7B McKINNEY'S
CPLR 8022, commentary at 397 (1974); 8 WK&M 3022.08 ("[A] statement that the pleading failed to meet the statutory requirements is insufficient.").
103 78 Misc. 2d 388, 356 N.Y.S.2d 938 (Sup. Ct. Albany County 1974).
'04 Defendant and others were indicted for the forgery and cashing of two lottery
tickets in the amount of $55,000. Defendant pleaded guilty to forgery in the second degree
in satisfaction of the indictment, Id. at 388, 356 N.Y.S.2d at 935.
105 CPLR 3020(a) states that "where a pleading is verified, each subsequent pleading
[with certain exceptions] shall also be verified." One exemption from the burden of
verification is as to matter to "which the party would be privileged from testifying as a
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to show cause, plaintiff wanted the court to direct defendant to serve
a verified answer.
The Supreme Court, Albany County, questioning whether defendant in fact would be able to sustain the claim of privilege against self0 nevertheless denied plaintiff's motion. While a defenincrimination, 1°
dant may seek an order compelling the plaintiff to accept an unverified
answer,10 7 a plaintiff, the court explained, has no right to compel the
defendant to serve a verified answer. 08 The remedy of a party served
with a defectively verified pleading, as contained in the plain language
of CPLR 3022, is to treat the pleading as a nullity and pursue a default
judgment. 10 9 The court observed, however, that in this regard the State
failed to act with "due diligence" in serving the required notice on its
adversary. 110 Moreover, the court categorized the notice's particularization of alleged defects in defendant's answer as "suspect."'I
witness." Id. See Travelers Ins. Co. v. Mulligan, 231 App. Div. 222, 247 N.Y.S.2d 85 (Ist
Dep't 1931); Curran v. Pegler, 17 Misc. 2d 345, 186 N.Y.S.2d 899 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County
3020.08.
1959); 3 WK&M
106 Plaintiff had contended that the privilege may not be asserted by defendant since,

having effected a disposition of the entire indictment by pleading guilty to a count
therein, he is no longer subject to criminal prosecution. 78 Misc. 2d at 389, 356 N.Y.S.2d at
935-36. In Knight v. Maybee, 44 Misc. 2d 152, 253 N.Y.S.2d 59 (Sup. Ct. Erie County 1964),
discussed in The Biannual Survey, 39 ST. JoHN's L. Rzv. 406 (1965), plaintiff, demanding a
verified answer, contended that the privilege against self-incrimination terminated with
defendant's judgment of conviction. The court noted that as a general rule a judgment of
conviction effectively removes the danger of further prosecution and consequently the
privilege cannot be properly and legally asserted. 44 Misc. 2d at 154-55, 253 N.Y.S.2d at 62.
It is to be noted that waiver of the privilege in a different proceeding, as for example,
a grand jury investigation or a coroner's inquest, does not constitute a waiver for verification purposes. David Webb, Inc. v. Rosenstiel, 66 Misc. 2d 29, 319 N.Y.S.2d 877 (Sup. Ct.
N.Y. County 1970), aff'd mem., 36 App. Div. 2d 691, 318 N.Y.S.2d 441 (1st Dep't 1971). In
addition, verification may be excused only as to the privileged portion of the pleading.
Knight v. Maybee, 44 Misc. 2d 152, 253 N.Y-S.2d 59 (Sup. Ct. Erie County 1964); 7B
McKiNNEY's CPLR 3020, commentary at 378 (1974).
107 See, e.g., Morris v. Fowler, 99 App. Div. 245, 90 N.Y.S. 918 (Ist Dep't 1904), where
the court held that plaintiff's service of a defectively verified complaint entitled defendant
to serve an unverified answer and compel plaintiff to accept it. Accord, Crimmins v.
Polhemus, 189 Misc. 183, 68 N.Y.S.2d 819 (Syracuse Mun. Ct. 1947) (plaintiff compelled
to accept defendant's unverified answer notwithstanding plaintiff's subsequent service of
a properly verified complaint).
108 78 Misc. 2d at 389, 356 N.Y.S.2d at 936.
109 Id. But see 3 WK&gM 3022.04. The severe character of securing a default judgment where the opponent's pleading is treated as a nullity makes it clear that the court
will allow the party in default to set the judgment aside and be given the opportunity to
correct the defective verification. A better method of handing defective pleadings, as
suggested, would be to permit the party, after giving notice of the defect and allowing a
reasonable time for the adversary to cure, to move to strike the pleading. It is doubtful,
however, that this manner is any more expeditious than the default judgment route. Id.
110 Notice was issued 48 hours after receipt of the defective pleading and thus
violated the 24-hour rule. 78 Misc. 2d at 389, 356 N.Y.S.2d at 936. See note 101 supra.
11178 Misc. 2d at 389, 356 N.Y.S.2d at 936. The court found it unnecessary to discuss
specific defidencies in the notice since it was "unable to find any authority to support
the motion." Id.
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Additionally, the court invoked CPLR 3026 which grants pleadings
a liberal construction absent prejudice to a party's substantial right
1 12
and concluded that the plaintiff here suffered no such detriment.
It was determined that preclusion of the State from possible prosecution of defendant for perjury by permitting the service of an unverified pleading should not serve as a basis for a claim of prejudice. 113
McMahon seems to have further illustrated that the CPLR is not
to be regarded as a plethora of mere technicalites to be raised throughout various stages of the proceedings for the sole purpose of delay. CPLR
3026 is designed to streamline the mechanism of a civil lawsuit, not
encumber it. Absent prejudice to a substantial right of a party, defects
in pleadings must be ignored. 114 The McMahon court, in concluding
that a liberal construction of the pleadings was warranted because
precluding the plaintiff from subsequently prosecuting defendant for
perjury did not constitute substantial prejudice, appears to have made
a wise determination in not requiring verification of defendant's answer, especially since the issues had been adequately framed for trial.
31 - DiscLostuE
CPLR 3101(a)(4): Court of Appeals applies a strict interpretationto
"special circumstances" requirement for obtaining disclosure from
nonparty witness.
ARnrci

Full disclosure of material and necessary evidence may be obtained
from a nonparty witness under CPLR 3101(a)(4), provided "adequate
special circumstances" are shown by the litigant seeking such disclosure.115 Although the statute does not specify what may constitute ade112 Id. at 389-90, 356 N.Y.S.2d at 936. See Kreiling v. Jayne Estates, Inc., 51 Misc. 2d
895, 897, 274 N.Y.S.2d 291, 293 (Sup. Ct. Suffolk County 1966) wherein the court, pursuant
to CPLR 3026, ignored defendant's allegedly defective verification on the ground that
plaintiff had! shown no prejudice to a substantial right. See also 3 WK&M J 3022.04, at
30-523 to -524 ("Irregularities in the verification will rarely result in prejudice to a party
or affect the substance of the litigation.').
113 78 Misc. 2d at 389-90, 356 N.Y.S.2d 936. See also 7B MCKINNEY's CPLR 3022, commentary at 399-400 (1974) (prospect of perjury coming out of a civil
pleading is remote).
114 CPLR 3026; Capital Newspapers Div. -The
Hearst Corp. v. Vanderbilt, 44 Misc.
3022.04.
2d 542, 543-44, 254 N.Y.S.2d 309, 311-12 (Sup. Ct. Albany County 1964); 3 WK&M
115 CPLR 3101(a) provides in pertinent part that:
There shall be full disclosure of all evidence material and necessary in the prosecution or defense of an action, regardless of the burden of proof, by:

(4) any person where the court on motion determines that there are adequate special circumstances.
With respect to the remainder of.CPLR 3101(a), paragraphs (1) and (2) apply to disclosure
by parties to an action and assignors of an action, respectively. Disclosure by a person who
is about to leave the state, resides outside the state, resides more than 100 miles from
the place of trial, or is so ill as to reasonably suggest that he will be unable to attend
the trial may be obtained under paragraph (3).

